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Crank and Buck: The Comppensability of Cardiac Conditions under Wyoming Worker's

The Compensability of Cardiac Conditions Under Wyoming
Worker's Compensation: Health Insurance or Worker's
Compensation?
INTRODUCTION

Heart attack cases present very difficult causation problems in
worker's compensation claims. The disease which eventually results in
a heart attack builds up over a period of years and the medical authorities
have not been able to determine what actually causes the attack.' It is
estimated that nearly half of all deaths in the United States are caused
by coronary disease and many individuals suffer severe disability as a
result of the disease.' The medical costs for treating heart injuries
are stag3
gering and far exceed the costs of treating other injuries.
With this problem in mind, the Wyoming Legislature attempted to
reduce the number of heart injuries compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act." The methods the legislature adopted are arbitrary and
confusing. To further compound the problem, the Wyoming Supreme
Court sought to formulate its own remedy and created a new class of beneficiaries. The problems in the statute cannot be cured by the judiciary
and the legislature must enact a new statute or even consider abolishing
heart attack compensation altogether.
This comment first examines the theory underlying the enactment of
worker's compensation laws, and then defines some of the terms regularly used in cardiovascular compensation cases. Although section 27-12603(b) of the Wyoming statutes 5 could conceivably cover various types
of cardiac conditions, this comment will only examine the compensability of myocardial infarctions. Second, a review of section 27-12-603(b) will
reveal that an injured worker must establish two basic requirements before
he can recover for a heart injury: medical causation and legal causation.
Third, two workable standards will be proposed for compensating heart
attack victims.
BACKGROUND

Worker's Compensation
A brief overview of the rationale behind the general worker's compensation law is helpful in understanding the confusing requirements for com1. Comment, The Meaning of the Term "Accident" in the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 535, 554 (1979).
2. The American Heart Association estimated that 985,040 people died of cardiovascular disease in 1982, nearly fifty percent of all deaths. Almost one-fifth of all persons killed by cardiovascular disease are under age sixty-five. About 43,500,000 Americans
have one or more forms of heart or blood vessel disease. AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION,
HEART FACTS (1985).

3. Juge & Phillips, A New Standardfor CardiovascularClaims in Workers' Compensation, 43 LA. L. REV. 17, 18 (1982).
4. WYo. STAT. § 27-12-603(b) (1977).
5. Id.
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pensating heart attacks in Wyoming. Worker's compensation laws were
widely adopted in the early part of the twentieth century.6 The Wyoming
Legislature also recognized the need for a new system to compensate
workers for employment-related injuries. In order to accomodate the needs
of both employers and workers, the legislature developed a compromise
which gave both groups certain benefits. Employers were granted immunity from suits in return for their contributions to the compensation fund.7
Workers received speedy relief for work-related injuries, regardless of the
lack of fault on the part of the employer and without the cost of legal
action
Recently, serious questions have arisen concerning the fairness of
worker's compensation laws. The employers' immunity from law suits has
remained in place thereby precluding a worker from obtaining increasingly
large judgments, while the benefits workers receive have remained low.8
As the United States Congress stated in the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970: "In recent years serious questions have been raised concerning the fairness and adequacy of present workmen's compensation
laws in the light of ...new risks to health and safety, and increases in
the general level of wages and the cost of living."'"
The Wyoming Legislature's failure to maintain an evenly balanced
compromise between the interests of the employer and the interests of
the worker has been addressed by the courts with sympathy towards the
worker.11 The Wyoming Supreme Court has acknowledged an intention
to liberally construe the coverage provisions of worker's compensation
acts and to narrowly construe the immunity provisions."' The result of
the liberal construction of the law in this area has been to place the financial burden for accidents on the industry rather than the individual
worker.' 3
Medical Terminology
A reading of decisions in cardiovascular compensation cases reveals
a judiciary that is at times confused by medical evidence. In order to effectively understand the area of cardiovascular compensation cases, lawyers must have a general background in cardiovascular terminology.
6. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 4, 5, at 23-40 (1978).
7. Id.
8. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Wyo. 1982), quoting Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 658 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979).

9. Id
10. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 27, 84 Stat. 1616
(omitted from the United States Code as executed 29 U.S.C.S. § 676 (Law. Coop. 1982), cited
in Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 659 n.5 (6th Cir. 1979).
11. In re Gimlin's Claim, 403 P.2d 178, 180 (Wyo. 1965).
12. Id
13. Wyoming State Treas. ex reL Worker's Comp. Div. v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548, 551
(Wyo. 1968).
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CardiovascularDisease

4
Cardiovascular disease or atherosclerosis is the build-up of plaque'
within the arteries of the human body. The plaque is deposited in the
arteries as a person grows older.'6 This build-up of cholesterol-plaque is
influenced by numerous factors but the most important factors are: (1)
the genetics of the person, (whether the person's family has a history of
heart disease); (2) smoking; (3) hypertension, (high blood pressure); and
(4) diabetes.' 6 Factors which influence the progression of cardiovascular
disease are called "risk factors."'"

The build-up of plaque in the arteries continues' until the build-up
reaches a critical point. When the build-up reaches a critical point, a

myocardial infarction may occur.'9
MyocardialInfarctions

A myocardial infarction is defined as a sudden insufficiency of arterial
blood supply to the cardiac or heart muscle. 20 A myocardial infarction can
affect different parts of the heart muscle. Therefore, myocardial infarctions are further defined according to what portion of the heart the infarction affects.' In layman's terms, a myocardial infarction is a heart
attack.
Keeping this definition in mind, we can now determine what happens
to a person who suffers a heart attack. For some reason,22 one or more
of the arteries supplying the heart muscle "plug up." The heart muscle
is then deprived of needed nutrients and oxygen. 23 This causes that part
of the heart muscle to die,2 1 resulting in permanent damage to the heart
muscle because the heart muscle cannot rejuvenate itself."

14. Plaque is a buildup in the arterioles containing lipid deposits. T. STEDMAN,
(5th ed. 1982). See also Juge & Phillips, supra note
3, at 19.
15. Atherosclerosis is characterized by irregularly distributed lipid or cholesterol deposits
in the interior of large and medium sized arteries. These deposits are associated with fibrosis
and calcification, and are almost always present, to some degree, in the middle-aged and
the elderly. T. STEDMAN, supra note 14, at 136.
16. In addition to the four major factors listed in the text, the following factors have
also been shown to contribute to atherosclerosis: (1)elevated cholesterol level in the blood;
(2) inactive lifestyle; and (3) stress. Juge & Phillips, supra note 3, at 19-20.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1095

17. Id
18. Id

19. See infra text accompanying notes 26-32.
20. T. STEDMAN, supra nOte 14, at 706.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

ld. at 706-07.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
Juge & Phillips, supra note 3, at 22-24.
Id.
Id at 24.
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Causes of Myocardial Infarctions
The exact triggering mechanism of a myocardial infarction is extremely difficult to pinpoint." In fact, medical science has not yet determined
exactly what occurs at the point in time that a myocardial infarction
begins.2 7 However, there are several theories of what causes the blockage
in the artery and the resulting death of the heart tissue.
One of these theories is that a blood clot forms in an occluded area"
of an artery, thereby impeding the flow of blood in the artery.9 A second
theory is that the artery spasms (constricts) and thereby closes the artery
at the point of the occlusion. 0 A third theory31 is that some kind of damage
occurs to the cells lining the artery causing them to release cholesterol
which ultimately blocks the artery in the occluded area." In any event,
the artery is somehow blocked in the occluded area.

THE LAW IN WYOMING

Section 27-12-603(b) of the Wyoming statutes provides that:
Benefits for employment-related coronary conditions except those
directly and solely caused by an injury or disease are not payable
unless the employee establishes by competent medical authority
that there is a direct causal connection between the condition
under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition,
and then only if the causative exertion occurs during the actual
period of employment stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for,
employees in that particular employment, and further that the
acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are clearly manifested
not later than four (4) hours after the alleged causative exertion.2
In In re McCarley, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that in order
to recover under section 27-12-603(b) a claimant must establish four re26. Id. at 22.
27. Helmuth & Helmuth, Heart Attack and Workmen's Compensation: Model Rules
of Practice,4 FORUM 113 (1969).
28. An occlusion is defined as the act of closing or the state of being closed. T. STEDMAN, supra note 14, at 974. Therefore, an occluded artery would be an artery that was partially blocked due to build-up of some material inside the artery. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20; Juge & Phillips, supra note 3, at 21. Technically, an occluded artery would
be completely closed, but the courts and physicians generally call a narrowing of an artery
an occlusion. To avoid confusion, we will call a narrowed area of an artery an occlusion.
Stenosis is the proper term that should be used to describe a narrowed area of an artery.
Stenosis is defined as an abnormal narrowing of a body passage, opening, canal, or duct.
3 J. SCHMIDT, SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE S-170 (14th ed. 1984).

29. Juge & Phillips, supra note 3, at 22.
30. Id. at 22-23.
31. There are other theories concerning what causes the actual blockage in an artery
which leads to a myocardial infarction but these three theories seem to have gained the most
acceptance. See id at 23.
32. Id.
33. WYo. STAT. § 27-12-603(b) (1977).
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quirements: 1) A period of employment stress unusual or abnormal for
employees in the same occupation as the claimant; 2) Some exertion during the period of unusual or abnormal employment stress; 3) Medical
testimony evidencing a direct causal connection between the exertion and
the myocardial infarction; and 4) That the acute symptoms of the cardiac
themselves within four hours after the allegedly
difficulty manifested
34
causative exertion.
In order to recover for a work-related coronary condition, a claimant
must prove that both medical causation and legal causation are present
in regard to the claimant's condition. Under McCarley, legal causation
is established by showing that requirement two is present. Medical causation is established if a claimant establishes requirement number three.35
Legal causation focuses on the work and establishes the standard of exertion necessary for an employee to be compensated. Medical causation
measures the causal connection between the work and the injury.
Medical Causation
A heart attack claimant must establish "by competent medical
authority that there is a direct causal connection between the condition
under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition. '36This
section of the statute states that a claimant must present some expert
medical testimony but it does not provide any guidance as to the burden
of proof a claimant must meet in order for the claimant to recover. To
determine what kind of medical testimony is necessary, the case law interpreting this part of section 27-12-603(b) must be examined.
In In re Vondra, 37 a case decided before section 27-12-603(b) was
enacted, the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that in order to meet the
medical causation requirement a claimant must show by a preponderance
of the believable evidence "that the work effort contributed in a material
degree to the precipitation, aggravation, or acceleration of the existing
'
In Kaan v. State ex reL Wyoming Worker's CompensationDividisease."38
sion, the Wyoming Supreme Court clarified medical causation under section 27-12-603(b).3 The court, after looking at earlier cases dealing with
medical causation,4' 0 stated:
From the rules in the cases just cited we can distill a simple
rule: The causal connection requirement is satisfied if a medical
34. In re McCarley, 590 P.2d 1333, 1335-36 (Wyo. 1979).
35. Requirements one and four further burden the legal causation requirement of number
two. Presumably, the legislature included them in the statute to limit further the class of
beneficiaries under the Act.
36. WYo. STAT. § 27-12-603(b) (1977).
37. 448 P.2d 313 (Wyo. 1968).
38. Id. at 318.
39. No. 84-44 (Wyo. Nov. 1, 1984).
40. Wyoming State Treas. ex reL Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Schwilke, 649 P.2d 218,
220 (Wyo. 1982); Yost v. Wyoming State Treas. ex reL Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 654 P.2d
137, 139 (Wyo. 1982).
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expert testifies that it is more probable than not that work exertion or stress contributed in a material degree to the precipita41
tion, aggravation, or acceleration of a myocardial infarction.
Even though the Kaan rule is simple and seems to set forth a workable
standard, there are still serious problems with regard to medical causation under section 27-12-603(b). Medical causation attempts to determine
the causal connection between the work and the injury. The medical causation requirement under section 27-12-603(b) does not accomplish this result
because it is impossible to precisely determine what triggers a myocardial infarction. This problem is compounded by the fact that expert
witnesses are willing to categorically state that a certain stress or strain
precipitated a myocardial infarction.
The statute requires that a claimant produce "competent medical
authority that there is a direct causal connection between the condition
42
under which the work was performed and the cardiac condition.
However, medical science has not at the present time determined what
exactly triggers a myocardial infarction. In a study by a committee of
the California Heart Association, a panel of five cardiologists, internists,
and other physicians well experienced in heart disease, answered certain
questions with regard to 319 compensation cases. In only forty-seven of
the 319 cases did all five doctors agree on the cause of the heart attack.
In ninety cases, four doctors agreed. And, in forty-eight cases, only two
could agree. When 101 of the same cases were presented to the same five
doctors without their knowledge that the records had been examined
previously, in thirty percent of the cases, the doctors reversed
themselves."3 Therefore, testimony by a doctor that there is a direct causal
connection would, in most cases, only be conjecture.
Claimants can usually find a physician to testify that a particular job
stress more probably than not "contributed in a material degree to the
41. Kaan v. State ex rel Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., No. 84-44, slip op. at 4 (Wyo. Nov.
1, 1984).
In Nuanes v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., No. 84-88 (Wyo. Jan. 23, 1985),
Justice Rose reasoned that even though the testifying physician refused to specifically use
the "magic words" of the Kaan decision, the court should inquire further and determine the
expert's meaning from "the totality of the information produced during direct and cross
examination." Id. at 3 (Rose, J., dissenting).
The medical causation requirement in Kaan is the only workable rule in the area of
worker's compensation cardiac conditions. It would be unwise to follow Justice Rose's suggestion and erode this simple rule. Physicians don't know what exactly triggers a myocardial
infarction, and the court should not further cloud an already obscure area. If a physician
fails to testify that "it is more probable than not that the work exertion or stress contributed
in a material degree to the precipitation, aggravation, or acceleration of a myocardial infarction," then the injured worker should not recover.
42. Nuanes, No. 84-88, slip op. at 4 (Wyo. Jan. 23, 1985).
43. See Comment, HeartAttacks and the Pennsylvania Workmen's CompensationAct:
Establishingthe CausalRelationship Between Employment and Injury, 81 DICK. L. REv.
111, 112 (1976), citing Heart Claims Under the California Workmen's Compensation AcA
13 CIRCULATION 448 (1956).
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precipitation, aggravation, or acceleration of a myocardial infarction."14
"Doctor shopping" is prevalent in worker's compensation cases."5 Even
though medical science has not accurately determined exactly what occurs when a myocardial infarction begins, physicians are often willing to
state that a certain stress or strain was the triggering factor of a heart
attack. 46 Even where claimants have a critical occlusion of a coronary
artery, physicians have testified that a certain stress precipitated the heart
attack. 7
Medical experts have been unable to determine what exactly triggers
a myocardial infarction. 4 Therefore, the legislature and the courts should
realize that medical testimony in this area has little value. If medical experts are unable to agree on the triggering factor of a heart attack, then
an internist or general practitioner cannot accurately testify that a specific
work-related stress or strain triggered the heart attack. There are a myriad
of factors which can trigger a myocardial infarction and it is unrealistic
for anyone to testify that a particular factor triggered a heart attack. This
is especially true in cases involving the compensability of myocardial infarctions under worker's compensation statutes because the injury must
be causally related to the work.
Because the Wyoming Legislature has required medical testimony
under section 27-12-603(b), the testimony in this area must be closely
scrutinized by the courts. Courts need the guidance that experts provide
through their testimony, but the courts should also be careful not to
overemphasize the substance of the physician's testimony.
LEGAL CAUSATION

The two most common standards of legal causation that have been
developed by the courts and legislatures are the "usual exertion rule" and
the "unusual exertion rule. 49 The usual exertion rule is nothing more than
a restatement of the medical causation requirement that the worker must
suffer an injury as a result of his usual work."0 The unusual exertion rule
requires the worker to perform more rigorous activities than his normal
daily work activity. The unusual exertion rule is a more restrictive standard of legal causation adopted by a minority of states because the
generalized nature of heart attacks makes them difficult to attribute to
the work activity."
44. Kahn, No. 84-44, slip op. at 4, (Wyo. Nov. 1, 1984).
45. Telephone interview with Terry Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Wyoming
(March 7, 1985).
46. See In re Vondra, 448 P.2d 313 (Wyo. 1968); Yost v. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel
Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 645 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1982).
47. Vondrm 448 P.2d at 315.
48. Juge & Phillips, supra note 3.
49. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 38.30, at 7-48.
50. Id.

51. Id The unusual exertion rule was originally used in other jurisdictions to determine the accidental quality of an injury. Since that time it has taken on importance by itself.
Several jurisdictions, including Wyoming, have adopted the unusual exertion rule as a requirement for legal causation. The rule is not used to establish the accidental nature of the
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The unusual exertion rule attempts to identify the cause of the heart
attack by determining which of two variables change: the ability of the
heart to function or the work. The Indiana Supreme Court stated the issue
clearly in United States Steel Corporationv. Dykes.12 "Was the inability
of decedent's heart to meet the demands [due to] ...an increase in the
workload beyond the heart's ability to function.., or... a decrease in
the heart's ability to meet an unchanged demand? The 'cause' is that which
has changed, not that which remains constant." s
The unusual exertion rule has been criticized for being unfair and
generally unrelated to causation.14 A usual exertion for one worker may
be unusual exertion for another worker. For example, suppose it is usual
for Worker 1 to lift heavy items and participate in heavy physical labor
in the course of his employment while it is unusual for Worker 2 to engage
in such activity. It is unfair to compensate Worker 2 for the lesser exertion which, while unusual to him, is not unusual to Worker 1. This is
especially true where Worker l's usual exertion is capable of causing the
heart attack. The above example illustrates that the unusual exertion rule
is not always a true indication of the cause of the heart attack.
The unusual exertion rule requires a standard to determine when a
specific exertion was "unusual." There are two basic methods of measuring unusual activity: the objective test, which compares the work of the
employee to the usual work of other employees engaged in the same or
similar activity, and the subjective test, which compares the work of the
employee to the employee's own usual work.5"
The Wyoming Legislature adopted the unusual exertion rule for heart
attack cases in 1969.56 As it was originally enacted, the Wyoming statute
required the employee to show the causative exertion occurred "during
the actual period of employment stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal
for, the individual employee, in that particularemployment."5 7 The purpose behind adopting the unusual exertion rule was to limit the number
of workers receiving compensation.
In the Wyoming Supreme Court's first opportunity to interpret the
1969 statute, the court adopted the subjective test in ruling that the exertion only had to be unusual to the injured employee. 5 The court's adoption of the subjective test appears to be consistent with the legislature's
original wording of legal causation. However, in 1977 the legislature
injury but is used as a separate statutory requirement for compensation. See Comment, Heart
Injuries Under Workers' Compensation:Medical and Legal Considerations,14 SUFFOLK L.

REV. 1365, 1390-91 (1980).
52. 238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111 (1958).
53. Id. at 607, 608, 154 N.E.2d at 116.

54. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 38.81, at 7-229 to 7-231.
55. Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601, 605 (1969). See also Larson,
The Heart Cases in Workmen's Compensation:an Analysis andSuggested Solution, 65 MIcr.
L. REV. 441, 462 (1966).
56. 1969 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 200, § 15.
57. Id.

58. Mor v. Haverlock, 566 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1977).
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amended the unusual exertion rule and adopted an objective test which
reads in relevant part: "stress clearly unusual to or abnormal for,

employees in that particularemployment."59 The court has ignored the

legislative amendment and continues to apply the original subjective test."
In further disregard of legislative intent to restrict compensation, the court
used the subjective test as the basis for establishing a less restrictive standard of legal causation for victims of previous heart attacks and thereby
expanded the class of beneficiaries under the Act."
To fully comprehend the history of legal causation under section
27-12-603(b), it is important to recognize the significant change in the law
resulting from the adoption of the unusual exertion rule. Originally the
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act did not provide for "special treatment" when the worker's injury was a heart attack. Heart injuries were
treated the same as all other injuries. All that was required was a showing that
there was a causal connection between the heart injury and the
62
work.

In In re Vondra,2 the Wyoming Supreme Court discussed the debate
surrounding compensability of heart attacks under worker's compensation acts in other jurisdictions. The court distinguished heart attacks from
more traditional forms of work-related injuries. It noted the almost univer64
sal presence in the human body of heart problems at some stage of life.
The court also recognized that an important degree of atherosclerosis of
the coronary arteries is present in approximately half of all American
males over the age of forty-five.65 The Vondra court also noted the diffiwith certainty the trigculties of the medical profession in ascertaining
66
gering mechanism of a particular attack.

The Vondra court applied the usual exertion rule because it appeared
more consistent with the Wyoming worker's compensation rationale. 67 The
court did not feel it could adopt the unusual exertion rule without a direct
legislative mandate because the unusual exertion rule would place heart
attacks in a special category. The court ended its opinion in Vondra by
inviting the legislature to clarify the status of heart injuries in worker's
compensation."
59. 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 142.
60. Wyoming State Treas. ex rel Wyo. Worker's Comp.Div. v. Schwilke, 649 P.2d 218
(Wyo. 1982). The court may not have known of this legislative amendment because no attorneys had brought the matter to the court's attention. As of this writing, the fact that
the statute was amended has still not been pointed out to the court.
61. Id
62. In re Vondra, 448 P.2d 313 (Wyo. 1968). See also In re Hill, 451 P.2d 794 (Wyo.
1969); In re Brannan, 455 P.2d 241 (Wyo. 1969).
63. Vondra, 448 P.2d at 313.
64. Id. at 315.
65. Id at 316.
66. Id at 315.
67. Id at 318.
68. Id
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The Vondra opinion, with its invitation to the legislature, was issued
on December 13, 1968.9 The Fortieth Wyoming Legislature convened on
70
January 14, 1969 and adopted the Wyoming Occupational Disease Law.
The section under cardiac conditions clearly sets forth the unusual exertion rule. 71 The legislature's acceptance of the unusual exertion rule effectively raised the burden of proving legal causation. In addition, the
language the Wyoming Legislature originally used in the 1969 Act,
"unusual to... the individual employee, in that particular employment,"
indicates an acceptance of the subjective test."
The Wyoming Supreme Court's distaste for the unusual exertion rule
was shown in its first opportunity to interpret it. In Mor v. Haverlock,"
Justice Rose began his opinion by acknowledging the legislature's adoption of the rule and then stated: "Regardless of the wisdom of the rule,
it must be applied to situations like that with which we are confronted
here." 74 In Mor, the court discussed the effect of the unusual exertion rule
on the burden of proof. "To sustain his burden of proof, as to the legal
causation, the statute requires that the employee show that the causative
exertion was clearly something beyond his normal routine--something
more than the worker's usual work." 75 The court made it clear that the
Wyoming Legislature had adopted the subjective test for measuring
unusual exertion: "It should be emphasized, however, that the exertion
in question must only be unusual to the employee-it need not76necessarily be unusual to others engaged in the same employment.
In 1977, when the Mor case was under consideration, the legislature
amended the legal causation requirements for coronary conditions under
the worker's compensation statute.77 The words, "the individualemployee,
in that particular employment" were changed to "employees in that parindicated that the subjective test was
ticular employment." 78 This change
79
replaced by the objective test.
69. Id at 313, 318.
70. The heart statute was originally part of the Occupational Disease Law and not the
Worker's Compensation Act. This is significant because the unusual exertion rule was intended to burden the legal causation requirements and not to measure traditional worker's
compensation theories as the rule was used in other jurisdictions. Therefore it is impractical
to determine Wyoming law based on other jurisdictions' interpretation of the unusual exertion rule. See Yost v. Wyoming State Treas. ex reL Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 654 P.2d
137 (Wyo.1982) (Rooney, J., dissenting).
71. 1969 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 200, § 15.
72. Id
73. 566 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1977).
74. Id at 222.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 142, § 27-361.
78. Id
79. In 1969 the Pennsylvania Legislature did just the opposite. Prior to 1969, Pennsylvania law required proof that the work effort was unusual to the claimant's occupation.
See, e.g., Billick v. Republic Steel Corp., 214 Pa. Super. 267 257 A.2d 589 (1969); McGowan
v. Upper Darby Pet Supply, 207 Pa. Super. 329, 217 A.2d 846 (1966). In 1969, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court replaced the objective standard with a subjective one in the case
of Hamilton v. Procon, Inc., 434 Pa. 90, 252 A.2d 601 (1969).
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In the 1979 case of State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation
Division v. McCarley, 0 Justice Rose clearly acknowledged the objective
test contained in the amended statute. Justice Rose stated that one of
the requirements of section 27-12-603(b) is that "[tihe claimant must
establish a period of employment stress unusual or abnormal for employees
in claimant's occupations.""' In using the objective test, the court appeared to recognize the legislative amendment and correctly abandoned
the subjective analysis developed in Mor"
However, in Wyoming State Treasurer ex. rel. Wyoming Worker's
Compensatin Division v. Schwilke, 3 the court readopted the subjective
test and used it as the basis for its holding. The worker, Schwilke, had
experienced heart trouble the night before his death. The next day
Schwilke performed jobs which were within his normal daily routine and
then died of a severe heart attack.' A unanimous court, speaking through
Chief Justice Rose, held that the legal causation requirement was satisfied
because normal activity can become unusual after the worker has previously experienced heart attack symptoms. "[W]e are of the opinion that the
circumstances of this case establish that the stressful work condition was
unsual to or abnormal for the deceased's employment."'
The court found the basis for legal causation in Schwilke by using
the subjective test of the unusual exertion rule established in Mor.
Notwithstanding the fact that the actual physical exertion performed by Mr. Schwilke was within the realm of his normal activity, the record reflects that prior to the performance of these
tasks he had experienced heart trouble. Under such circumstances,
the once normal activity of his workday indeed became very
unusual and abnormal for Mr. Schwilke. Under Mor v. Haverlock
this is all that need be proven.86
When the Schwilke decision is examined in light of the original
legislative intent of the unusual exertion rule, it becomes apparent the
court has expanded compensation beyond the limits the legislature contemplated. Legal causation examines the worker's exertion, not the
worker's physical health. The court relied on the previous subjective test
to reach the desired result when it was clear that the statute required the
objective test. Using the objective test, Schwilke would have had to show
that the exertion was unusual compared to other employees in his line
of work. It is clear Schwilke did not fulfill this requirement and should
not have been compensated.87
80. 590 P.2d 1333 (Wyo. 1979).
81. Id. at 1335.

82. This case was decided on medical causation grounds and therefore the legal causation analysis is merely dictum.
83. 649 P.2d 218 (Wyo. 19821.
84. Id at 219.
85. Id at 222.
86. Id

87. The record does not contain any evidence that Schwilke's work was unusual on the
day of his death. Id
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In Yost v. Wyoming State Treasurerex rel. Wyoming Worker's CompensationDivision," the court affirmed the Schwilke decision. The facts
in Yost demonstrate just how far the court is willing to go to find legal
causation. In Yost4 medical testimony indicated that Yost suffered a heart
attack anywhere from two days to two weeks prior to his death. The
precise time or place of this first attack was not known. On the day of
his death, Yost did not even perform his normal truck driving activities
because before he died he sat around for thirty to forty-five minutes
waiting for a tractor to push his truck out of the unloading pit. The court
found that Yost, after being at work for two hours and performing his
normal work activity for one hour, had employment stress clearly unusual
to, or abnormal for, employees in that particular employment.89 The Yost
court cited Schwilke for the proposition that it is unusual stress for a
worker suffering symptoms from a previous heart attack to continue to
exert himself.9 0
The case law on heart attacks since the enactment of section
27-12-603(b) was summarized in Creek v. Town of Hulett.9 1The Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision denying compensation to a police officer dying of a heart attack resulting from his work.
The court noted that only a factual question was presented and examined the lower court's decision with a high degree of deference.2 The court
discussed its previous holdings in this area and examined the two factual
situations which exist under Wyoming's unusual exertion rule. " First, the
court identified those situations in which the actual work activities were
different in kind or greater in degree than those normally required of the
employee. The court then noted a second category. This category involved
work activities which the court determined were unusual or abnormal exertion by virtue of the condition of the workman."" The court summarized by stating: "The thrust of our application of the unusual exertion
rule leads to the conclusion that the award of worker's compensation
benefits results because at the time of the critical event the employee was
different as compared to his priorand usual condition."9
The two categories outlined in Creek clarify the court's position concerning legal causation for heart attacks in Wyoming. The determinative
question is whether the worker has previously experienced heart trouble.
A healthy worker must show that his heart attack resulted from an
unusual exertion. A worker suffering from pre-existing heart disease only
has to show some job-related exertion, or in essence only has to satisfy
the usual exertion rule. With this standard, the court has deviated from
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

654 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1982).
Id at 138-39.
Id at 140.
657 P.2d 353 (Wyo. 1983).
Id, at 354-57.
Id at 356.
Id
Id
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determining causation, because the job-related exertion is more likely the
cause of the heart attack in a healthy worker than the worker suffering
from pre-existing heart disease.
The new class of beneficiaries created by the court under the statute
tends to further cloud an already ambiguous unusual exertion rule. The
ruling by the court that even usual exertion can become unusual 6 makes
the tenuous causal connection between the work effort and the cardiac
attack even more questionable. The result is arbitrary because one worker
is compensated for usual exertion whereas another worker can only receive
compensation if he establishes an unusual exertion.
The court has also disregarded the legislative intent of the statute
by using case law from other jurisdictions whose statutory requirements
are different.97 In Schwilke, the court stated: "[O]ther courts have also
taken a similar stance- namely, that a normal activity can become
unusual after the individual has previously experienced heart attack
symptoms." 98 The Wyoming Supreme Court cited authority from Alaska,
Kansas, and New Jersey."
An examination of these cases from other jurisdictions reveals that
these cases are not good authority for the proposition that normal activity can become unusual. None of the three jurisdictions relied upon by
the Wyoming Supreme Court attempted to determine whether a normal
activity can become unusual because none of the jurisdictions had adopted
the unusual exertion rule. 00

A

WORKABLE STANDARD

Heart attacks are a lifestyle disease which develop over a period of
years. 10' The generalized nature of the disease makes it difficult to fac96. Schwilke, 649 P.2d at 222.

97. In Creek, the court stated, "we emphasize that in examining such situations we
look at the activities which are usual for the particular employee, and note that this is the
rule in other jurisdictions which have adopted the unusual exertion rule even though the
statutory requirements are different." 657 P.2d at 356.
98. 649 P.2d at 223.
99. Id citing Thornton v. Alaska Workmen's Comp. Bd., 411 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1966);
Hanna v. Post and Brown Well Service, 199 Kan. 757, 433 P.2d 356 (1967); Aladits v. Simmmons Co., 47 N.J. 115, 219 A.2d 517 (1966).
100. All three of these jurisdictions followed the usual exertion rule. See Yost v. Wyoming State Treas. ex reL Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 654 P.2d 137, 144 (Wyo. 1982) (Rooney,
J., dissenting). As the Kansas court stated, "if a workman's existing physical condition,
whatever it may be, gives way under the stress of his usual labor, his death is an accident
which arises out of his employment." Hanna v. Post and Brown Well Service, 199 Kan. 757,
766, 433 P.2d 356, 362 (1967). See 1B A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 38.64(c), at 7-193 to 7-199.
There are three situations in which courts compensate a worker for a heart injury when the
worker has continued exertion after feeling the symptoms of a heart attack. First, when the
statute requires an accident in order to compensate the worker. The Wyoming statute does
not require an accident. Second, when the statute uses a subjective approach to examine
the worker's efforts. The Wyoming statute requires an objective approach. Third, if the
employer insists on continuation of work after an injury and the statutes from the first and
second examples are present. In Schwilke and Yost, there was no evidence that the employer;
insisted that the work continue and the statutory requirements were not applicable.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 14-32.
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tually attribute the attack to the work. The practical considerations require establishing "artificial boundaries" so that heart cases will not
become compensable whenever they take place even where work-connection is questionable. The Worker's Compensation Act is not intended to
provide general life and health insurance for employees.
To guide the legislature in future attempts at enacting a new "heart
attack statute," we suggest the following as workable standards for deal1 2
ing with heart attacks under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.
Alternative 1
Wyoming should abolish the section of the Worker's Compensation
Act dealing with coronary conditions.103 The causal relationship between
the work effort and the heart attack is minimal at best. 0 4 However, there
is a strong causal relationship between an employee's lifestyle and coronary artery disease. The real cause of heart attacks is the underlying
coronary artery disease.'0° In many cases, the employee will eventually
have a heart attack no matter what kind of work he performed. For this
reason, cardiac conditions should not be compensable under worker's compensation systems.
Abolishing compensation for heart injuries under worker's compensation is not a harsh alternative when considering the compromise between
the worker and the employer. Worker compensation laws were enacted
to provide employees speedy relief for work-related injuries regardless of
102. The two suggested alternatives are not intended to be an exhaustive review of solutions for compensating heart injuries under worker's compensation. The legislature should
also consider the followingWaiver - A waiver agreement would allow a worker to relinquish his right to compensation for any subsequent injury to his pre-existing heart condition.
Second Injury Fund- These funds are common in the United States but do not generally
cover heart injuries. Under this system the employer compensates the worker for that portion of the disability occurring because of the work-related injury. The second injury fund
pays the difference between the employer's portion and the total benefits payable to the
worker.
Apportionment - Apportionment statutes are similar to second injury funds in that the
employer is liable only for the degree of disability resulting from the work-related injury.
See Comment, Problems and Suggested Solutions to the CardiovascularCases in the
Workmen's Compensation Fiekl 6 WILL. L.J. 95 (1970).
103. In Wyoming, the employer must take the worker as he finds him. For example,
even if the worker is injured because of a pre-existing condition, the employer must compensate the employee. See Exploration Drilling Co. v. Guthrie, 370 P.2d 362 (Wyo. 1962). The
legislature should statutorily abolish this rule as it presently applies to cardiac conditions.
If a worker who suffers a heart attack at work is found to have a critical occlusion of
a major coronary artery, the legislature should provide that the injury is not compensable.
The real cause of the injury is the underlying coronary artery disease and not the work effort. See Lindbloom v. Teton Int'l, 684 P.2d 1388 (Wyo. 1984). To require the employer to
take a heart attack claimant as he finds him would require the employer, and the Wyoming
Worker's Compensation Division, to become health insurers.
104. In re Vondra, 448 P.2d 313, 317 (Wyo. 1968)
105. See Comment, supra note 1, at 554, citing Hellmuth & Helmuth, HeartAttack and
Workmen's Compensatio" ModelRules of Practice,4 FORUM 113, (1969). "It is widely agreed
medically that no single event, no matter how great a strain, can cause an heart attack on
a healthy heart and there is no evidence to indicate that coronary heart disease is ever
etiologically related to employment." Id.
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the lack of fault on the part of the employer and without the cost of an
extended legal battle. In return for these benefits, the employee gave up
the right to sue his employer for any employer negligence resulting in injury to the worker. 0 6 In essence, the worker gave up his right to sue the
employer and sacrificed his right to obtain a large judgment for the right
to obtain speedy relief for work-related injuries.
It is hard to imagine how an employee who suffered a heart attack
could sue his employer for negligent acts resulting in injury to the worker.
Ordering a worker to do strenuous work which resulted in a heart injury
would not constitute negligence. The employer would have no knowledge
of any underlying coronary artery disease giving rise to the heart attack.
The proximate cause of the worker's injury is not the employer's actions,
but is the worker's underlying heart disease. When the Wyoming Legislature enacted a statute compensating workers for heart injuries it created
a windfall for the workers. Withdrawing that windfall is not inequitable.
Alternative 2
If the Wyoming Legislature does not wish to statutorily abolish heart
attack compensation, the legislature must be careful in enacting a new
law to avoid new problems. Also, the courts must be careful in applying
the statute to avoid the problems discussed above.
A legal causation standard must be used to distinguish between those
heart attacks resulting from work and those heart attacks resulting from
a progressively deteriorating coronary condition. The solution can be found
in a two part analysis which encompasses a minimum health requirement
and an objective exertion requirement in the employment.
The first part of the analysis is the substantial health deterioration
test, which denies compensation where the worker's health has deteriorated so that any normal daily activity is an over-exertion."0 7 By examining
a worker's health, a court will be examining objective factors which require less legal analysis and litigation. Factors which a court should consider are: 1) the percentage of occlusion in the artery leading to the damaged area of the heart, and 2) risk factors such as smoking, hypertension,
diabetes, cholesterol level, heredity, and other known medical causes of
heart attacks. 0 8
The second part of the analysis determines whether the worker's exertion was the actual cause of the heart attack. The injury must ariseout
of and in the course of the employment.' 0 9 To meet this legal causation
requirement, the worker's exertion must be greater than a normal non106. See supra text accompanying notes 6-13.
107. County of Cook v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 II. 2d 10, 370 N.E.2d 520 (1977).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 14-35.
109. The "arising" test is the basic requirement in most worker's compensation laws.
It provides the causal nexus between the injury and the employment. Courts apply the "arising" test to distinguish those heart injuries attributable to the natural progression of the
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employment life exertion. ' 0 The worker's activity must present a greater
strain than a strain to which the general public would be exposed.' This
test measures the non-employment exertion of the general public and not
the non-employment
exertion of the particular worker suffering the heart
1 2
attack.'
This proposed statute places a substantial financial burden on the
employer in order to promote responsible actions in the workplace."13 The
employer is in a good position to identify worker's with risk factors. By
educating workers on the benefits of modifying risk factors and by controlling the workplace to reduce the risk factors the employer can promote safety and reduce the chance of heart disease. The cost of these programs will be balanced by the reduction in the payment of disability
payments, litigation expenses and training new personnel to replace heart
injury victims." 4 The legislature should encourage this type of activity
by placing a portion of the financial burden on employers.

CONCLUSION

One aspect of cardiovascular compensation in Wyoming is clear; the
Wyoming Legislature must act to correct both its original error in enacting section 27-12-603(b) and the Wyoming Supreme Court's faulty interpretation of the ambiguous unusual exertion rule. In order for a worker's
compensation system to function properly, only work-related injuries must
be compensated. The Wyoming Legislature and the Wyoming Supreme
disease from those in which the employment was a contributing factor. See Comment, supra
note 51, at 1380.
Ironically, worker's compensation laws and specifically the "arising" test, were intended to reduce court delays, to reduce costs and work loads arising from litigation, and eliminate
fee payments to lawyers and witnesses. See City and County of San Francisco v. Worker's
Comp. Appeals Bd., 583 P.2d 151, 155 n.4 (1978).
110. County of Cook v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 10, 370 N.E.2d 520 (1977). See
1A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 38.83. Dean Larson developed a similar test to determine
causation on the basis of employment risk and personal risk. Under Larson's rule, the standard for compensation would depend on whether there was a history of heart disease. A worker
with a pre-existing heart condition contributes a personal element of risk to the employment
situation. With a personal risk element involved, the employment must contribute something
substantial to offset the causal contribution of the personal risk. Larson proposed that a
worker only be compensated for a heart attack if the employment contribution takes the
form of an exertion greater than that of non-employment life. On the other hand, a worker
without any prior history of heart problems, and therefore not contributing a personal risk
would be compensated for any injury connected with the employment.
The personal risk test has been criticized because it is difficult to establish the amount
of stress and exertion present in normal non-employment life.
111. County of Cook, 69 Ill. 2d 10, 370 N.E.2d 520 (1977).
112. Id
113. For a similar line of reasoning see Spencer, The Developing Notion of Employer
Responsibility for their Alcoholic, Drug-Addicted or Mentally Ill Employee: An Examination under Federaland State Employment Statutes andArbitrationDecisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 659 (1979).
114. The American Heart Association estimated the total yearly cost of cardiovascular
diseases to be 72.1 billion dollars, with thirteen billion dollars as a result of lost output due
to disability. AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION, HEART FACTS (1985).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol20/iss2/11

16

Crank and Buck: The Comppensability of Cardiac Conditions under Wyoming Worker's

1985

623

COMMENTS

Court have strayed from this basic premise. Worker's compensation is
not general life and health insurance and the standards for compensating
heart injuries must be changed.
PATRICK

J.

CRANK AND KENNETH
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